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THE CONCEPTION OF GOD IN MODERU PHILOSOPHY 
(A Presentation of the Views of Josiah Royce,Henri Bergson,W1li1am 
J ames and H.G. Wells) 
H.A.Bas111us 
The two conoepts,religion and philosophy,are two opposite 
poles of reasoning: The one clings to revelation for its source 
and authority while the other finds its basis in speoulation,some-
times preceded by observation. When speaking of the conception of 
God"in philosophy,we must,therefore,diseooiate from our minds the 
popular religious oonnotations · of the term. In religion the concep-
tion of God is usuall~t the st~ing point while in philosophy it 
is,at best,a primary means. The difference is very well carried 
out in the· worde of Prof.Wright,who in his STUDENT'S PHILOSOPHY 
OF RELIGION writes the following: 
11 The_ conception of God is employed,not for the purpose 
of sentiment and devotion,but in the endeavor to understand the 
universe,and man•s relation to it. The symbols of physics are 
justifiable,because through them man is enabled to some extent to 
understand and control physical conditions. The symbol of God 
is justifiable in philosophy,provided that througn it man is bet-
ter able to understand and adapt himself to the world in which 
he li~es; otherwise not." 
We see,thel,1ore,tha.t to ~hilosophy God is merely a symbo1 
of expression which mi ght be compared to\the algebraic •x•; and,as 
the nx11 varies according to the equation in which it is employed, 
so also the symbol of God varies according to the system of phi1o-
sophy in which it is included. Bchtolasticiam sought and succeeded. 
for a long time in standardizing the symbol,but with its overthrow 
the wildest vagaries became current. Prof.C.A.Beckwith of Chicago 
describes and accounts for this variance with the words: 
°From a condition of almost complete rigidity the idea 
of God is becoming to a high degree plastic. Many innovating con-
oeptions of God are not only put forth,but are receiving wide and 
serious consideration. In this it simple shares the movement whiah 
has overtaken all ideas. Various causes have conspired to this re-
sult •....• and perhaps more influential than all ••.• interesta (1a) 
the desire to find some interpr~tation of reality which shall ap-
proximately express the reaction of experience to the infinite 
mystery of the world.• (p.64) 
If the above mentioned flux is characteristic of all 
philosophy,then it is particula~ly true of modern ph1losophy,wh1ch 
___ __, _________________ _ 
we may arbitrarily define as philosophy since 1860,the year fn 
whioh Schopenhauer,the last of the Kantians,died and upon whose 
death began the great struggle between idealism and naturalism,wh1ch 
characterizes modern philosophic thought. From t hese two major di-
visions innumerable variations arose in the course of time. We can-
not trace all of these in our paper,not even the most prominent. We 
do,however,touch upon a leading thinker of both England and the Con-
tinent as well a s t wo friendly enemies in American philosophy,namely 
H.G.Wells,Henri Bergson,Josiah Royce and William James. 
In defining the scope of our paper,we have tried to hold before 
ua several very general objectives. I~ accordance with our thesis 
we shall,of course,treat the religious speculations of the above 
na111ed philosophers. We shall nevertheless also show the roots of 
the respective s ystems from which these speculations take their 
source. We shall also attem~to show the endeavors of harmonizing--
if the expr eEsion may be pardoned-religio-philosophic thought with 
the subst'ig'ta of revealed. religion together with the fact of and 
cause for the i nevitable failure of such attempts. And finally,we 
hope to point out on the basis of our study a definite and construc-
tive value accruing from philosophioo-religio•s study. We shall, 
however,despite objectives,endeavor to assume an entirely objective 
attitude in t he presentation of the subject matter,leaving the facts 
in the case to speak for themselves. 
Harvard University was for a long time the seat of the great 
major 
American philosophers,and practically every/branch of modern thought 
was represented by one or the other of the luminaries occupying 
Harvard's chairs of philosophy among whom were numbered Santayana, 
Perry,Royoe and Wm.James. It is Prof.Ralph Barton Perry,who baa aa-
ewned the role of historiographer for this famous group,a.nd we sba11 
have occasion to refer to his writings from time to time. 
In speaking of his colleague Royce,who is regarded as being 
.)'=".---------------------
America• a formeoet exponent of Absolute Idealiam,Prof.Perry re-
counts a n second wave of Kantian influence• which II came in America, 
as in England,in the form of the introduction of Hegel•. And Hegel, 
he says,marks the beginning of American idealism of which Josiah 
Royce was the leading proponent. Royce•s · philosophy always retained, 
according to Perry,a "naturalistic and empirical flavor",which fact, 
blended with subsequent influences abroad,is easily accounted for 
in Royce•s u l timate conclusions. Josiah Royce was born in California 
in 1855 and was educated at the University of California before 
going to Germany, where he came under the influence of Lotze, Scho-
penhauer,Ka,nt and Schelling. He spent the remainder of bis life, 
teaching philosophy at Harvard from 1882 till 1916,.tlle year of his 
demise. 
It is interesting to note from our point a£ view the.t,among 
various obj ectives,Royce sought for a philosophical interpretation 
of Christianity,which was prompted by intense social interests as 
well as early religious training. When meeting this thought,we 
immediately hearken back to Thomae Acq'Q.!nas and the Scholastics, 
for they sought the same goal which motivated Royce•s speculattions; 
and we find t hat both have much in common from the fact that their 
methods were alike idealistic. Royce's efforts in the religious 
field are well attested to by such prominent works as THE RELIGIOUS 
APSECT OF PHILOSOPHY (1885), THE CONCEPTION OF GOD(1897), and THE 
PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY (1913). 
As was previously·· stated,Royce was idealistically inclined, 
and that trend of thought assumes that •the word 'idea• means simply 
an, adequate grasp of reality•. Royce,bowever,blended his naturalis-
tic and emplirical tendencies with his maj'S\91 inclinations by stres-
sing the reality of ideas. He came to regard reality aa •the ful-
filment of ideas", and from this premise he proceded to evolve the 
Absolute whose na.me his system bears. 
• 
We have stated that Royce bad strong social leaninga,and 
Prof.Wright of Da.rt~outb sees in them tb~s~ting point for the 
• 
developement of bis system. Wright writes: 
1 The fact of the mental isolation and moral uniqueness of 
every human being on t he one hand, with the fact that his knowledge 
and hie duties bring him into organic relationship with other hu-
man beings,and with the physical universe on the otber,lead to the 
conolueion\t;hat the universe as a whole must be an organic whole, 
unified in the knowledge and will of an Absolute Mind." (p.382) 
In looking about him,Royce noticed that,although we all ~par-
take of the same reality,observing the same phenomena with the 
sBl:le sensory organs and synthesizing our sensations with the same 
mental process,yet no man can know the_thoughts of another. We are 
very similar; s~ill we are distinctly and inviolably separate. 
Assuming then that 1) "reality must fulfill!!! idea.an, 
and 2) "ther e can be no facts that are not experienced" ,Royce rea-
soned the following from his observations noted above: Reality 1a 
a completely r ationa l ordered whole,no part of which can exist a-
lone. We morta l s know only parts of reality. Could we ever secure 
complete knowledge of reality,then idea and its object would be 
identical. Since,however,reality is a completely rational ordered 
whole,there must be a uoint somewhere which serves as the junction 
for complete knowledge an4omplete reality. This point or juncture 
Royce termed t he Absolute. And this Absolute was his conception of God. 
The conception of God as was advocated by Royce is best 
presented in the book by that title- which contains the addresses· 
of Profs.Royce,Le Oonte,Howison and Mezea delivered before the Ph1-
loeophioal Union at the University of California in 1895 (THE CON-
CEPTION OF GOD). 
In the address noted above,Royce first sets out to lay down 
a definition of God,and the result is the following: 
God ia na being who is conceived as possessing to the full 
all logically possible k:nowledge,insight,wisdom •••• This conceived 
attribute of omniscience •••• would involve •••• what is rationally 
meant by OmnipotEp1ce,by Self-Ooneciousneas,by Self-Poasesaion---
Jea,I shou,ld unh~itatingly add,by :.c;r:esa,by Perefction,by Peace.• 
l- """ '.\..Ne~ ... ~_n~~ .J-4.1~_, ~l,s;.t:l/:;w. 
Royce is a dualist in the question of epistemology: He holds 
that knowledge is comprised of thinking and experience. By thinking 
we merely viaue.lize a possible experience,and thinking ia,therefore, 
only the questioning concerning the nature of a certain experience. 
From this we must conclude that questioning is characterized by the 
divorce of idea from its object. 
The answer to our questioning represents the experience which 
verifies the idea, whose essence we defined as mere questioning; and 
it is God who,by virtue of Hiij/ Omniscienoe,answera. All ideas with 
God are verified by experience. This does not,however,mean that 
God merely views an external world of foreign truth. No,He comprehends 
all thought and experience in Himself; ~e thinks and experiences 
with us; and then He answers our questioning. Hence,Royoe concludes, 
God's Omniscience must involve,besides Omnisoienoe,all the other di-
vone attributes mentioned above. Technically expressed,He possesses 
nAbsolute Experience" and "Absolute Tl;lought11 ,i.e.,a wholly complete 
and self-contained Experience and Thought needing no oorament,aupple-
ment or correction. 1.{oreover, these Absolutes are not disjointed, but 
completely organized as to their oonnectiona,so that a perfect whole, 
a single system of ideas results. It is,indeed,God who is this Ab-
solute Mind (Logos,Problem Solver,World Interpreter,All-Inclusive 
Self)."Through Him we share in the understanding and appreciation 
of the meaning and purposes of a common world. 11 He is in time and 
eternal,perceiving events as they follow in our consciousness and 
also the entire succession as a totum simul. 
Having verified the positied definition,Prof.Royce deter-
mines to prove it. When we speak of our experience,he says,wep,t-
tribute it to reality,and it follows that,by recognizing our ex-
perience as fragmentary,we imply 11 an absolutely organized.experience, 
in which every fragment finds its place•. We might categorize thia 
argument as one by implicat~on. 
Royce e.dmits,however,that in speaking of reality and an Ab-
solute Experience we are talking of mere conceptual objects-
Platonic ideas,as it were,and the question now arises,is the Abso-
lute Experience real? The opposition claims that it is not real, 
because it cannot be experienced. Royce,however,proves himself e-
qual to the occasion by exhibiting a dialectical adroitness worthy 
of a Master of Novices of the Society of Jesus; for he maintains 
that II every effo:?:t to deny an Absolute Experience involves, then, the 
actual assertion of such an Absolute Experienoen. His complete argu-
ment is best presented by direct quoting: 
"If every reality has to exist.just in so far as there is 
experience of its exi stence, then the ~erinination of the world of 
experience to be t his world and no other,the fact that reality con-
tains no other f acts t han these,is,as the supposed final reality, 
itself the obj ect of one exoerience,for which the fragmentariness 
of the finite world appears.as- a presented and absolute fact,be-
yond which no reality is to be viewed as even genuinely possible. 
Fo:?: this final experienoe,the conception of any possible experience 
beyond is known. a s an ungr ounded conceotion,as an actual impossi-
bility. But so,this final experience ls by hypothesis forthwith 
defined as One,as all-inclusive,as determined by nothing beyond 
iteelf,as assured of t he comnlete fulfilment of its own ideas con-
cerning what is,---in brief,1.t becomes an absolute experience.• (p.43) 
The relation of t his Absolute Experience to our own expe-
rience, which is fini~e,1s regarded by Prof.Royce as the relation of 
nan organic whole to its own fragments0 • 
This conception of God was belie~ed by the Harvard idealist 
to be the true philosophic conoeption,a fact obvious from the ter-
minology which he applied to God. With the term "Absolute Experience• 
he uses int.erchangeably the expressions "Absolute Self" ,"Absolute 
Thought",holding that they are merely different aspects of the same 
truth,for,he says,~God is known as Thought Fulfilled; as Experienoe . 
absolutely organized,so as to have an ideal unity of meaning; as 
Truth transparent to itself; as Life in absolute accordance with 
idea; as Selfhood eternally obtained". (p.45f.) 
But Josiah RoY.ce,as all idealistic philosophers,had al.so 
.to solve thw p:;roblem of evil and .zonize it wit~ his system. '?his 
~;~ ~ -nu,44~ _..._ --~-1,,1_,1,1._ .. ____ ,,,.+ ...... a. .. .; 
' . 
• 
and struggle (the various inf~rmities of life) appears as a pa.rt 
of a whole in whose wholeness the fragments find their true place, 
the ideas t heir realizat1on,the seeking its fulfilment,and our whole 
e 
life its truth,and so its etrnal rest----that peace which trans-
" cends the storm of its agony and its restlessness.• (p.47) It is, 
according to t his theory our very finiteness,the bitterness and 
infirmity and incompleteness of life which manifest the glory and 
existence of God,i n that these fragments of the Absolute imply 
its reality. In fact,evil is not merely something to be born with 
regret; it i s ab solutely neces sary in this world,in order that God 
may triumph. Thus, f or ins tance,some idealists find a substantiating 
parallel in the hi stony of the Churoh,in so far as they mai~n 
that t he pass ion of Christ was es sential,in order that the spiri-
tualization of the Church mi ght follow. They regard the apparently 
evil world as har monious to God in His infinity,or,more candidly, ~ 
Vo 
God even en joys our suffering. A logical conclusion would be that ~ 
we in i mmortality shall also partake of this seemingly unjust joy.f!:1 >e· 
~ ~ 
And,although Royce does not openly profess belief in this immor- ~ z ~ 
tality, many scholars cla im that it is consistent with his thought ~-i j 
0 Cll ~ 
and hence pronounce his s ytem complete. ~ c,_ ::> 
~~ s 
As an aftermath,Prof. Royce pr~sents an apology for his con~~ • 
~ot; 
ception of God to Christiana. He identifies his speculatively con"'-".!:.. OZ 
<!!-:, 
ceived deity with the one vaguely defined by Aristotle in an a:iuall! o 
speoulat~ve .manner. The Christian God,1.e.,Fulfilled Thought or 
Self-poss~ssed Experience,he statea,has long been placed in oppoai~ 
tion to hie concept of God,the Absolute Experience. But it rema.ined 
for Christian mysti.cism to harmonize the two,defining and correlating 
them as "the God of practical faith" (Christian) and "the God of 
philosophic definition" (Idealistic). And he passes the palm to 
st.ihomas Acquinas in whose work he believe the reconciliation to 
have been oulmillj,ted. Although ex,pressing himself as impatient with 
~../,/ ~ ~.8Atl41,Jr.;,t ~ , • 
8. 
represented in the historical faith•,Royoe stoutly maintains that he 
is not a pantheist but distinctly theistic, and that all Biblical at-
tributes of God may exactly be predicated also of hdis conception of 
God as the Absolute. 
Nor is Royce alone in the la.st stated position. Representative 
of the agreement which a -nu.'llber of other philosophical scholars ac-
cord to him in t he matter is the following statement of Prof. Wright: 
"The conception of Go~a.dvocated by Royoe •.••• satisfaotorily 
validates prayer a.nd other forms of religious experience ••.•...•••. 
In these experienoes,if we accept Royce's conception of God,we 
can say that the individual i dentifies himself with the thought 
and will of God. If it is i n some degree through gaining the view-
point of God,the universal Self,that we are able to conununicate with 
each other and know a common world,and if it 1s through our identity 
with Him that we can unite in common loyalties,and if it is through 
our common social exneri ence in the Church that we have learned to 
know and apprecifl.te Christ, then surely we must conclude that it is 
through God that we gain the spiritual reinforcement and other bene-
fits afforded us in our religious experience." (p.386) 
As a concluding remark to our comment on Josiah Royce's con-
ception of God,we mi ght add that his conception is quite generally 
regarded as the most brilliant and typical of the absolute idealists. 
It i:s, i n line w i. th the same thought, likel",ise considered the sharpest 
challenge t o the conceptions of a finite God which are advocated 
by other Europea,n and American philosophers,a.s we shall ha.ve occa.-
sion to observe with the developement of our thesis. 
In the man Royce we saw the social psyohologist,theorizer 
and dialectician. In Henri Bergson,the French Jew,we have an oppo-
site type,and,as we shall see,his philosophy is also characteris-
tically opposite. Bergson was born in Paris in 1859 and began his 
career as a mathematician and physicist. As is often the case,however, 
with one who studies the 11 cold sciences• ,Bergson was piqued by the 
insoluble mystery underlying material nature. He could not resist 
the lure of metaphysics and eventually became a student # and 
teacher of philosophy. After having published saeral books in this 
field (TIJ.'1!: A1'ID FREE WILL; MATTER AND UEJ.IORY), he became professor 
Rt thA nn11A~A nA Trenoe 1n J900. seven vears lat_er_his chef-d1oeuvre 
9. 
appeared---OREATIVE EVOLUTION,which is regarded by ma.ny as •our 
oe,atury I s first philosophic masterpiece". 
We h&ve previously pointed out th&t modern philosophic thought 
is oharoterized by the bitter struggle between idealism &nd natura-
lism,and at the beginning of the present century the time was ripe 
for the deci 4ing struggle,in whioh Bergson was destined to play an 
important role. Physicist and mataphysician,Bergson constituted 
what in the American political parlance would be termed anl ideal 
•compromise candidate". Nor was the French Je'fl missing from the_ 
front line of battle. He t hrew himself into the thick of the fray, 
but his position was unique in that he took no side but instead 
attacked both combat a.nts,and that successfully. The Elan Vital proved 
fatal to the gross materialism as well as the intellectualism of the 
age. Ber~son has often been likened to Kant,who fought the intellec-
tualism which began with Locke and ended with Hume. Da.rwin had re-
vived the ancient dragons whom {ant had slain,and Bergson now ap-
peared on the scene to repeat the lethal mission of Kant. 
Henri Bergson is generally classed as a French spiritualist, 
viz.,one who holds the fundamental reality of the creative will; but 
he also had natur~listio leanings. The failure of i ntellect to grasp 
reality,he says,is a total failure,and he,therefore,repudiatea al1 
conoeptu&l thought in favor of instinct and intuition. We note here 
the influence of and similarity to Kant which we alluded to earlier, 
and in this connection Seth Pringle-Pattison quotes Bergson as saying, 
• if you read THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, you see that Kant has ori-
tized not reason in general,but a reason fashioned to the habits and 
exigencies of the Cartesian or Newtonian physics•. (p.48) Bergson 
held that the intellect distorts reality,because reality is not or-
dered and rat:Honal to fit the concepts of the intelleot,but 1a rather 
fluid,mobile,oontinuous,novel and perpetual. As such it can be gras-
ped only in the flux of life • Seth Pringle-Pattison sums up this 
10. 
idea with the words: "The intimate appreciation of living experience 
fmmma the basis of the whole Weltanschauung which be (Bergson) otters 
ua'.(p.69) And Will Durant contrasts Bergson's idea of finding reali-
ty only in the flux of life to the action of the moving picture- oa-
mera,which "divides i nto static poses the vivid current of realityR. 
'We see matter and mi ss energy" (p.494),writes Durant,an~ in these 
words he has swnmed up Bergson's criticism of the intellect in favor 
of intuition. 
Bergson, however,is constructive and explains that the function 
of the intellect i s d i ctated by the needs of practical life. 1 To try 
to fit a concept on an ob ject is simply to ask what we can do with 
the object,and what it can do with us. To label a certain object 
:1th a certain concept i s to mark in precise terms the kind of action 
or attit ude the ob; ect should suggest to us". ( INTRODUafION TO META-
PHYSICS, trans. ,p. 41). He holds that we conceptualize by mee.ns of 
-t:c, 
perception and memory,this dualism aiding us~decide what is best 
under the circumstances. And our decision is based upon and ultimate-
., ly ef fected by our 9r a ct1ca1 needs in life. 
The remedy for loosing ourselves from what we rnight call 
the standardizing effect of the i ntellect 1s,according to Bergson, 
very obvious and simple, na.r:1ely the putting aside of our pr11ctical 
needs,which needs Ral ph Barton Perry describes as "objectifying our-
selves and so bringing ourselves under the s!)8.t1aliz1ng,decomposiDg 
and deter ministic categories of sc1enoe11 • Only in this way can W8 
attain the metaphysical insight of intuition,thus immediately beco-
ming aware of that "duration wherein we aotn and wherein •our atatea 
melt into each other". (MATTER AND ME&ORY,trans.,pp.241,243-4) 
Intelle9t and intuition are,bowever,meconciled by the tact 
that intellect does not f~lsify reality by contrarineslf>ut rather 
by distortion in so far as intellect aelects,in the making of oon-
oepts,from reality a~oording to its ~raotioal neede,leaving wba.t 
11. 
raaina because i~ is not required for action. Intuition on the o-
ther hand experiences reality as a totum simul •• 
Having deduced from the fact of the failure of intellect pro-
perly to perceive reality the further fact that reality is not a 
constant but a flux,and having also reconciled the dua~iam of in-
tellect and intuition,Bergson now prooedes to explain re'\fity with 
still another of t he dualisms with which his sytem abounds. Reality 
for him consists of l i fe and matter,a premise deducible from the 
idea of flux. Bot h are,hcmever, mere aspects of the ea.me reality pro-
vided t hat we consider reality as na movement or activity which h&s 
different degrees of i ntensity". Life,he holds,represents reality 
as "gathered all at once into a moment of creation,or focussed to 
a point of pure a.ctiv1ty11 ; matter is the aspect of reality when 11 it 
tends to relax and di s solve,and then become rr1ore repetitive,homoge-
neoue and stagnant". It is the reconciliation of these two aspects 
of reali ty,so apparent in .natural evolution,which lead to that fa-
mous inve11tion of · Eergson,the Elan Vital,whioh he describes as a 
vital i mpulse representing the fight of creative life against tbe 
inertia of matter. From the struggle between the effort of life to 
maintain and increase 1 tself au1idst the drag and inertia of materia-
lity, everything has and still does evolve. Life becomes victor in 
the struggle by storing up energy which can be explosively released. 
This is,for instance, a very ·obvious phenomenon in the evolution of 
plant life. The storage of energy culminates in animals in •instinct• 
and in huma.n beings in II intelligencen. Thus in the endless struggle 
of the Elan Vital everything evolves. This 1s,briefly,the concep-
tion of creative evolution as it was understood by Bergson. 
Bergaon•s cosmogony is now complete with the exception of a 
God. But his God follows,or rather precedes,acoording to the point 
of view,his entire thought. The persistently creative life from 
the Elan Vital to intellegenoe is GodJ Will Du.rant happily phrases 
12. 
Bergaon•a deity as follows: 
"This persistently creative .life,of which every individual and 
every species is an experiment,is•what we mean by God; God and Life 
are one. But this God. is finite,not omnipotent,---limited by matter, 
and overcoming its inertia painfully,step by step; and not omniscient, 
but groping gradually towards knowledge and consciousness and •more 
light 1 • n (p. 502) 
Durant continues by quoting from CREATIVE EVOLUTIOH,p.248: 1 0od, 
thus defined,has nothin~ of the ready-made; He is unceasing life,ao-
tion,freedom. Oreation,so conoeived,is not a mystery; we experience 
it in ourselves when ,, e act freely. 11 • 
Durant's method of drawing an apparently correct conclusion of 
Bergson's conception of _God on the basis of several seemingly clear 
sentences from t he works of t he philosopher himself is very charac-
teristic of a legion of scholars in attempting to determine an inevi-
table oonclusion to which Bergson's philosophy might lead. Durant 
finds i n Bergson's thought a finite God,much akin to Wm.James• con-
ception as we shall see later,and utter-ly irreconcilable with the 
God of Christianity. We find,kowever,in the extensive literature co-
vering Bergson's t hought,an even more extensive variation of opinion 
as to his conception of God. The subject is perhaps best presented 
in the book BERGSON AND RELIGION by Lucius Hopkins Hiller,assistant 
professor of Biblical i nstruction in Princeton University. Hiller 
covers this range of differing opinion by professing the belief that 
Bergson's conception of God is consistent even with the Christian 
conception, somewhat modified. 
In reviewing the widely divergent opiniona,we note that Berg-
son has been accused of pantheism. Charles Oorbiere,for example,in 
the REVUE DE THEOLOGIE,1910,writes the following: 
•Bergson ascribes to God consciousness and liberty but only 
in a vague way •.••• Life alone is clear and God is hardly more than 
the central hearth of the universe's energy ••••• He is ent1re1y im-
manent ••••• Bergson•s conception leads to pantheism.• 
And Prof.liiller,1n meeting the attaok,oonfesses that much 
of Bergson's writing is ambiguous,and,therefore,of a qua11ty eaa11y 
adaptable to pantheism. He cites as an example of ambiguity,adaptable 
to pantheism, the follo" ing from CREATIVE EVOLUTION: 
•Life as a whole,from the initial impulse that thrust it into 
the world,will apuear a s a wave which rises •...• This rising wave 
is consciousness.: ••• On flows the current,running through human 
generations,subdividing itself into individuale ••••• Thue souls ••••• 
are nothing else than the lit tle rills into which the great river 
of life divi4es itself7flowi ng through the body of humanity.• 
We see that it certainly would not be unjust to maintain that 
the sub-lined words con~ain pantheism. Prof.Uiller,however,reoalls 
Uuirhead.•s caution regarding "driving Bergson's language too ha.rd". 
Miller mainta ins that one must read CREATIVE EVOLUTION •in the light 
of its material and aim" ,remembering that Bergson waged war also a-
gainst certain dogmatics of t heistic religion,which,together with the 
natural diff iculty of penning a description of his unique Vital Im-
pulse without the use of t heological terminology,made the avoidance 
of absolute ambi guity almost impossible. 
Bergson has a lso been called pluralist because of the many dua-
lsima which are to be found in his system,partioularly the dualism 
of mind and matter although Bergson traces these latter two to a 
common origin. Sir Oliver Lodge takes this point of view when,writing 
in OU~REHT LITERATURE,April, 1912,he says: 
"I am i mpressed with two things----firet,with the reality and 
activity of powerful but not almighty helpers, to whom we owe gui-
dance and management and reasonable control: and next,with the fear-
ful majesty of still higher aspects of the Universe,infinitely be-
yond our ut1noet possibility of thought.• 
On the basis of the facts noted by the Englishma.n,one must 
admit that the charge of pluralism against Bergson is also tenable. 
There are several writers,however,who exonerate the French-
Jewish thinker not only of pantheism,but also of pluralism,and some 
even categorize his sytem as monistio. Thus,for instance,H.C.Corranoe 
in the HIBBERl' JOURNAL of January,1914 writes that "Bergeon•a Creator 
is imrnanent in nature,but not,like the god of panthe1am,ident1o&1 
with it•. Prof.Miller is heartily in accord with this opinion. Uu.1.r-
head,whom we mentioned before,likewise writing in the RIBBER? JOURBAL, 
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this time of July, 1911, takes a more definite stand in the matter, as 
follows: 
•so far from resting in any facile pluraliam,he (Bergson) is 
led by the very de"Oths of hie own monism to reject the current state-
ments of it. His philosophy may be said to be in reality an appeal 
from a shallower to a deeper form of unity. 11 
Le Roy,the Catholic modernist defender of Bergson,even finds 
a personal God in Bergson's philosophJ. Referring to Bergson in the 
REVUE ~'EO-SCOLASTIQUE (cf. N. Balthasar),November,19O7 and February, 
1908,he states hi s opinion thus: 
'We cannot regar d the source of our life otherwise than perso-
nal. We cannot . rega r d Hi m v impersonal. We seek in Him our perso-
nality. God is personal in that He is the source of our personality. 
He is i mmanent in us but also transcends us and also the world.• 
And in a letter by Bergson in ANNALS OF CHRISlIAN PHILOSOPHY, 
also quoted by Le Roy in A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSOB,monistio 
and personal i nclinations may be found although the statement on .. 
Which t his opi nion i s based is vague and indefinite. Bergson writes: 
1 The cons i derations set forth in my ESSAY ON THE I MMEDIATE 
FACTS OF CONSCI OUSNESS (Time and Free Will) are intended to bring 
to light the fact of liberty; t hose in MATTER AND m~dORY touch 
upon t he reality of spirit; thase in CREATIVE EVOLUTION present 
creation as a fact. From all this we derive a clear idea of a free 
and creating God, producing matter and life at once,whose creative 
effort is continued,in a vital direction,by the evolution of spe-
cies and t he construction of human nersonalities. 0 .. 
Much more definite evidence that Bergson c·onsidered himself 
a monist is presented in an interview with Bergson by Louis Levine, 
published in the NEW YORK TIMES,February 22,1914,and also very widely 
quoted: 
"This source of Life (God) is undoubtedly spiritual. Is it 
personal? Probably. There are not sufficient data to answer this 
question,but Professor Bergson is inclined to think that it is 
personal. It seems to him that personality is in the very inten-
tion of the evolution of Life,and that the human personality is 
just one mode in which this intention is realized. 
1 It is,therefore,very probable that the spiritual source of 
life whence our personality springs should be personal in itself. 
Of oouree,personal in a different way,without all those accidental. 
traits which in our mind form part of personality and which are 
bound up with the existence of body. But personal in a larger sense 
of the term----a spi~itual unity expressing itself in the creative 
process of evolution:• 
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On the basis of the evidence cited above,Prof.Miller seeks to 
prove the monism of Bergson•syiew. He first makes the Kantian distinc-
tion between deist and theist, quoting the Sage of Koenigsberg as sa-
ying that II the deist believe that there is a God; the theist that 
there is a living God11 (the former is purely rational,but the latter 
is connected with revela tion). He also recalls that Baldwin's DICTIO-
NARY OF PHILOSOPHY defines theist as one who thinks of God •as a 
Being who,by i nt elligence and freedom,as originator of the cosmos, 
contains within Hirnself the ground of all things. He thinks of God 
as entering i nto persona l relations with men; as the Controller of 
t he World whose cours e He directly affects". Hence,Prof . J!iller would 
maintain t hat Bergson is a theist. He goes even further than that, 
for he believes t hat Bergson's position is compatible with Christian 
utiJX theism although he admits that certain difficulties present 
t he1nselves i n t lJ e r econciliation, e.g., the fact that Bergson rules 
out 11 tbeologica.l finalism". 
Whether ~iller•s conviction is tenable or not remaina,of 
course,a moot question; on the other band,however,it must also be 
admitted that his position cannot be disproven. The line of ieast 
resistance,in t his case evn more tempting than usual,would be to as-
sume with Prof. Horace Meyer Kallen of the University of Wisconsin 
that in t he philosophy of Bergson raa.y be found the fin1 te God of 
James, the Christian God of the Old and New Testaments and the Ab-
solute God of .the philosoph~rs. 
It s eems,however,that the general indefiniteness of Bergson's 
system makes it practically impossible definitely to establish his 
actual conception of God. He himself,it seems,professes a mon1st1o 
and even theistic belief. As regards his wr1t1ngs,however,1t might 
be best to admit thefpteB~b111ty of all ten\able implications and 
., 
await further word from Bergson or one of his disciples whiob w11~ 
eliminate the flexibility. 
16 • .,, 
We have eo far in our thesis treated the systems of a prominent 
rrenchman and an equally prominent American, Let us add to these the 
philosophy of William Jamee,and we shall have a completed triangle; 
for James was the antithesis of Royce and at the same time the American 
complement of Bergson whom he admired and from whom he received a 
direct stimulus for much of bis thought. 
Wm.Ja:mes was born in New York in 1842 and was the brother of 
the slightly less prominent Henry James. Durant mentions the well 
known saying wbioh,I tbink,originated with the American 1iterary cri-
tic John Uacy to the effect that while Henry James wrote stories in 
psychology,his brother William wrote psychology in stories. The fact 
remains that both of the boys were devoted to psychology,which fact 
may perhaps be regarded a.a either the direct result or,on the other 
band, the ree.otion to the swedenborgian mysticism to which their fa-
L 
tber was addicted. The brothers studies f,rst in this country and 
then in France whereupon William returned to America and took his 
li.D. degree at Harvard in 1870. He remained at Harvard as a teacher 
till his death in 1910. He,as did Bergson,began his work with the 
physical sciences but could not resist the Oircean lure of Metaphy-
oics,and he successively taught classes in anatomy,physiology,paycho-
logy and finally philosophy. He wrote and published a number of wide-
ly known books among wl,ich the most widely read are THE PRINCIPLES 
OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890)---this is regarded as his masterpiece and ia 
a standard work in the pragmatic field---THE WILL TO BELIEVE (1897), 
VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EX~ERIENOE (1902),PRAG}JATISll (1907) and A PLU-
RALISTIC UNIVERSE (1909). 
Some of the titles of James• _works have beoome termini technioi 
in t he philosophic system which he built; tbus,far example,pragmatiam 
and pluralism,with radical empricism i■serted,might be said to cover, 
in a general way,the philosophic thought of Jamea. Durant defines 
,pragmatism thus: 
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"Instead of asking whence an idea is derived,or what are its 
premises,pragmatism examines its results; it •shifts the emphasis 
and looks forward•; it is •the attitude of looking away from first 
thinga,principles,categoriee,euppoeed necessities~and of looking 
towards last things,fruits,oonsequenoes,faots•.• \p.558) 
Prof.Wright explains the idea similarly by defining the so-called 
'pragmatic test• with these words: 
1 The simple test of the truth of a proposition is the observa-
tion of the practical consequences that logically follow from its 
aooeptance; it is verified,if action upon it is followed by the con-
eequenoes that could rea sonably be expected to follow•. 
The i dea of pragmatimn is considered uniquely American because 
of its passion for 11 results11 ; and,a.lthough its roots may be found in 
Kant's CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON,in Schopenhauer,in Darwin's 
survival of the fittest,in t he utilitarianism of Spencer and Uill, 
it may well be sa id to be mostly the suggestion of 11 the American scene•. 
By r adical empricism is meant the attempt to fathom the flux 
and continuit y of life as this was advocated by Henri Bergeon,and 
which is known only by sensory experience. 
Sensory experience,according to James,postulates a pluralism,i.e., 
that the world i s an unf inished product in which we must continue to 
fight for the good. "Compromise and mediation are inseparable from 
the pluralistic philosophy",says James,and on the basis of these words 
he seeks to develope- a God who meets the pragmatic test most suooeaa-
fully,viz.,a God who fits best into the world-picture,or who 1 is &t 
once most probable on theoretical grounda,and most rational in the 
broa.de~ sense of making a 'direct appeal to all those powers of our 
nature which we hold in high esteem1 • 1 (Perry,PRESEN'l' PHILOSOPBIOAL 
TENDENCIES,p.370f.) 
Jam~s claims a vague affinity with Luther and,before him,St.Paul 
in his piu~alistic speoulation,for he holds that they were the first 
to realize that n you are strong only by being weak ••. .. You cannot 
live on pride or $elf-suff1cingness. There is a light in which al:--~ 
the naturally founded and currently accepted dist1not1one,exce11enaea 
• 
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and safe-guards of our characters appear as utter childishness. Sin-
cerely to give up one 1 s own conceit or hope of being good in one•s 
own right is the only door to t he universe's deeper reaches.• (A PLU-
RALISTIC U!UVERSE,p.3O4). Man,according to James,must aoknowle~e 
. 
something greater outside of him,a tacit reply· to intuition,as it 
were; and. this something he calls n religious consciousness". He places 
it beyond the world of logical understanding,invoking thereby the 
shadow of Immanuel Kant, a.nd also beyond the world of logical experience 
and even psychological experience. "In a word11 ,he writes,"the believer 
is continuous,to his own consciousness,at any rate,with a wider self 
from which saving experiences flow in.n (Op.cit. ,p.3O7) 
In defining t hi s wi der self,James first of all repudiates the 
Christian conception of God, and also the conception of God that is 
advocated by t he i dealistic pantheists. He refers to the Christian 
conception as the God of Soholasticism and says that it is •a preten-
tious sham •••.• It means les s than nothing, in 1 ts pompous robe of 
adjectiv,esyexemplified in the definition,"Deus est Ens,a se,extra et 
supra omne genus, neeesaarium, unum, infinite perfectum, simplex, immutabile, 
i mr11ensum,aeternum, i ntelligens", etc •• (PRAGl.tATIS}.I,p.121). Durant says 
that Scholasticism asks, what is a thing? and loses itself in nquid-
dities", and likewise James maintains that it pictures God and hia 
creation 11 as entities distinct from each other" and II still leaves 
the human subject outside of the deepest reality in the universe•. 
(THEISTIC OONCEPr ION OF GOD,p.25) 
The conception of God which wae held by his colleagu.e Royce, 
and which we developed earlier,he regarded as the culmination o~ the 
views of Spinoza,Fiohte and Hegel; he condemned this view,which he 
held to be pantheistic, on intellectual and moral grounds. In the first 
place,by professing a Perfect Absolute,he said,one cannot account for 
II 
the obvious ignora.nce,misery and sin 11\ the world except by the poor 
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evasion that they are only limitations,privations and non-existent. 
He regarded its exponents as being.so drunk with abstractions as to 
be imnervious to concrete realities. And in the second plaoe,he be-
lieved "the moral holidays" which a panthei tic God 1 whose universal 
immanence will infallibly ineure,regardless of their own failures 
and shortco111ings, the salvation of the whole universe" to be a ooafes-
sion of i ndolence.Philosophers must choose between religious pantheism 
·and anti-pant heistic mora lism in order satisfactorily to solve the 
problem of evil, and J ames chose moralism,holding that no monism could 
solve t he problem of evil a nd that 0 any absolute moralism is pluralism; 
any absolute religion is moni sm11 • ( LITERARY REMAINS OF THE LATE HENRY 
JAl1ES, p.118). J ames believed that everywhere choice was exercised in 
life,and hence absolute moral ism is pluralism. It might in this con-
nection be recalled that Durant distinguif.[lhed between 11 tender-minded• 
(religiously inclined) tempera~ments and •tough-minded" (materialistic; 
insistent u~on facts). James was both of these,and he regarded plu-
ralism as t he only solution over and against the monism of absolute 
religion. 
Discarding both the Scholastic (Christian) and the pantheistic 
(Absolute) ideas of God,James conceived a finite God who is a part 
of the universe arid r.hom Theo.Flournoy,his interpreter,desoribea 
according to our mortal needs,as follows: 
11 What we need is a God who really•. exista,who is a personality 
lying outside our own,and other than us,---a power not ourselves 
and more powerful than we are; not a God of whom we speak in the 
neuter g~pder and in the third person,aa of some general law,but a 
God who~~ddress directly and intimately as 1Thou•; not a distant 
God enthroned,majestic and impaseive,on high,but a God who will des-
cend into the dust and degradation,to suffer and to labor there,to 
join us in our daily struggle against the powers of evil and all the 
obstacles arising in our path,a God who knows and appreciates our 
ideals,and who collaborates with us and we with Bim to bring about 
their realization. Now it is not monism,however idealistic it may 
be,which can furnish us with such a God; but only pluralism.• (pp.146f. 
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James held that experience reveals to us a world unfinished and 
imperfeot,one which is being painfully created through the cooperation 
of its members. Only such a universe could offer opportunity for moral 
action,and only in such a universe could we hope to meet that Helper 
and Companion whom we need as God. And God must be finite,for He is 
just another of t hose "each forms• who fights with us. Thus James 
also sought to solve the problem of evil by proving evil to be,with 
the good,an intrinsic part of the universe,and an element which man 
and God coordinately combat. Here we find both the pragmatistic and 
the pluralistic i deas in full sway. 
And J ames• radica l empiricism answered that such a God,finite, 
personal and striving,could be found here. He writes: 
"The line of least res istance; the,as it seems to me, both i*heo-
logy and philosophy, is to a.cc·ept, along with the su:9erhuman conscious-
ness, the notion t hat it is not all-embracing, the notion, in other words, 
that there is a God,but t hat He is finite,either in power or i~ kn~wledge 
or in both a t once. 11 (A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE,p.~11) ...&..1;, , 
And he now goes on to prove this contention from a·peculiar bit. 
of experience. Religious pqenomena;he held,which intellect and science 
cannot explain,attest to a superhuman intervention in human affM.ra 
which is the finger of God. His studies of various forms of religious 
experience, e.g., 11 healthy-mindedness" ( continuous growth) ,conversion, 
saintliness a nd mysticism,led him to regard the above conclusion as 
inevitable. It i s ,of oourse,based upon .the testimony of pantheistic 
mystics,but James accepted it nevertheless because of its universal 
character and also because it fitted so·perfectly with his pragmatic 
tendencies despite much criticism from the •ultra-knowing". He held 
that it was through the sub-conscious,so d~staateful to modern materia-
listic psychology,that religious experience ~eaohes the soul,and he 
was su9ported in this view by a thinker,otherwise independent of him, 
the Genenvese theologian,Oeisar Malan,who considered the sub-conscious 
the basis of 11 all individual religious experience from the simp1e fee-
ling of moral obligation to the most esoteric experiences of Christian 
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life.• (of.G.Fulliquet: LA PENSEE THEOLOGIQUE DE CESAR MALAN,Robert, 
Geneva,1902,p.286) • . James argued that,although science cannot explain 
t he ultimate source of t hese experienoes,the fact that they are ape-
rienoe removes t · e possibility of their being anti-scientific. That 
they do not recur according to 11 la.ws11 1s also concurrent with James• 
pluralism (althougn it eliminates the concept of the Absolute) since 
to the empiricist II the perennial laws of science •.•.• are nothing 
more t han abstract formulae, save in the concrete instances where they 
find t hemselves realized". 
As t o ~het her God Hi mself is a monism or a pluralism,James left 
an. open question. He s eems,however,to tend to a polytheistic concep-
tion,a sort of spirit ual hierarchy,although absolutely unlike the 
pagan pantheon of old; f or he says: 
11 .r.ieanwhile the pr actical needs and experiences of religion seem 
to me sufficiently met by t he belief that beyond each man and in a 
fashion continuous with him there exists a large power which is friend-
ly to hi14 and t o hi s i deals. All t hat the facts require is that the 
power should be both other and larger than our conscious selves. Any-
t hing l ar ~er will do,if only it be large enough to trust for the ne■t 
step. It need not be infi nite,it need not be solitary. It might con-
ceiveahly even be only a larger and more god-like self,of which the 
present self ll!!ould t hen be but the mutilated expression, and the uni-
verse mi ght conceiveably be a collection of such selves,of different 
degrees of i nclusiveness,wi th no absolute unity realized in it at all. 
Thus would a sor t of polytheism return upon us, ••••• which,by the 
way,has a l ways been t he real religion of common people,and is so still 
today. 11 (THE A:lIETI ES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIEMOE, pp. 524-6). 
In su1nming up his interpr etation of James• Ood,Flournoy makes 
the startling st a tement that he confidently regards "James• personali-
ty and philosophy a s freely Christian in spirit"; and,although James 
never professed any of the orthodox creeds 11 because of an innate dis-
like of theological for14ulaen, he often referretl to nwe Christians• and 
was in great sympathy with the 11 deeper e1notions of the great figures 
of Christianity". Flournoy,however,regards James• ph1losophio ideas 
as being in accord even with the Scriptures,stating that Christ was 
really the first pragmatist when he declared that •by your fruits ye 
shall know them"; the.t Christ treated the problem of evil pluraliati-
as-.--~-------~-------~--
0&111,as does Ja.meEJ; and that Obrist did not teach an •Absolute• God 
but rather the II Father", the great Ally who desires our welfare and 
who demands only our cooperation in resisting and casting out all e-
vil. Flournoy believes that II James• theism remains true in fundameni, 
tale to evangelical theism" and concludes his treatise,as follows: 
11 In leavi ng this subject I would point out once more that the 
great idea. which dominates James• religous moralism,----that human 
effort and divine power must collaborate for the salvation of the 
world,----is after all no more than a develonement of the thought 
of the Apostle: •we a.re la.borers together with God• • 11 (p.165) 
Thus,as is often the case in philosophy,and as we saw particu-
larly in the case of Bergson,we again meet with perplexity also in 
defini ng t he Jamesian conception of God. Only in one general point 
can we be su r e, and t hat is t he fact that James,as was consistent 
with hie pluralistic dootrine,developed a finite God who was virtu-
ally litt le more than a demi-god in opposition to the absolute quali-
ties at t ributed to the Gods of both pantheism and Christianity. 
~e shall next in our study turn to what may be called the prac-
tical application of philosophic 11 truths11 to religion by a quas1-
philosopher,in t a is case the very excellent writer of fiction,Mr.B.G. 
Wells of Engl and. 
Mr.Wells describes his religious convictions in GOD,THE INVISIBLE 
KING, which book,we presume,wa.s supposed to be epoch-making as a syn-
thesis of modern religious thought. In lµs preface he warns the •or-
thodox" against being shocked,for his· work precedes from the basis 
that the Council of Nicea was insincere and that it foisted a figment 
of Alexandrian thought upon mankind in the creed named after it,in so 
far as it attempted-a compromise betwemGod the Creator and God the 
Redeemer by manufacturing the Trinity. This compromise Wells regards 
as a feature of all religions,and to him the relation of the Father 
to the Son is nothing more than "a mystical metaphor". He confesses 
a complete agnosticism of God the Creator,bu.t complete faith in God 
the Redeemer; both of these profeseions,however,are to be uDderstood 
Ul.le 
in a peculiar Wellsian sense which we shall develope as we procede. 
~e aannot help but ascribe to Mr.Wells the stigma of Unitarianism, 
traces of which seem very apparent in his writings. And certainly he 
is guilty of the basic principle of Unitarianis~,for he teaches a com-
plete repudiation of all cr eeds,albeit a faith in God,whom he defines 
as a Whimsical fancy dicta.tee, and who runs the gamut of rationalism 
and religious s entimental! ty from Schleiermache:r to Harry Emerson 
Fosdick. 
This English t hi nker,wgo would meddle wita theology,forcibly 
reject s t he Chri s tian conception of God as it was formulated .at Nicea. 
He believes t hat the Emperor Constantine's desire for the unity of 
t he real m t oget her wi th t he political ooportunities for the Church 
v.•ere a t t he root of the Ni cean II compromise". The Christians were for-
ced into t he Tri ni tari a n oontroversy,a.ccording to llr.Wells,for the 
• followi gn rea sons: 
"The Christians would neither admit that they worshipped more 
gods t han one becau se of t he Greeks, ·nor deny the divinity of Ohrist 
because of t he Jews. They dr eaded to be polytheistic; equally did 
t hey. dr ead t he lea st ao~a r ent detraction from the nower and imnortance 
of t heir saviour. They- were forced into the idea of the Trinity by 
the necessity of t hos e contrary assertions, a.nd they had to make :bt 
a myst ery orot ected by curses to save it from a reductio ad absurdum. 1 
(p.10) -
Our frothing friend takes a final dig at all of the great &oc-
trines of Chris tianity by saying that they were the products of "theo-
logy by conuni ttees11 • 
Following his apostacy,he introduces the new "revelation". 
Wells has come to a rea lization of t he true God through experience, 
a sta tement which sounds familiar to those of us who are acquainted 
with t he history of rationalism. And this experience is,upon the ba-
sis of comoarison with a wide circle of acquaintances and in its ge-. . 
neral aspecte,universal. Experience tells him that God is 1) finite, 
an~not infinite; 2) Not the Life Force,Will to Live,or Struggle 
for Existence; 3) an emanation from within and not from without man. 
Wells calls this the "new religion", ,rhioh he re~arde as havi~g no 
founder and no beginniDg,but being raFt/er · a proved universal expe-
rience,the consensus gentium,as it were. And he finds that man ha.a 
come to a knowledge of this universal God by first feeling the •need 
of Godn (an experience much akin to Christian contrition) whereupon 
the "realization of God11 follows (much as does Christian conversion). 
This somewhat arbit~ary God the Bri~isher defines thus: 
"God comes we know not whence,into the conflict of life. He 
works in men a.nd t hrough men. He is a spirit,a single spirit,and 
a single person; he ha s begun and he will never end. He is the im-
mortal part and leader of mankind. He has motives,he has characteris-
tics,he ha s an aim. He is by our poor scales of measurement boundless 
love,boundless courage,boundless generosity. He is t hought and a 
steadfast will. He is our friend and brother and the light of the 
world. That briefly is the belief of the modern mind with regard to 
God. There is no very novel i dea about this God,unless it be the idea 
that he had a beginning. This is the God that men have sought and · 
found in all a.ges,as God or as the Messiah or the Saviour. The fin-
ding of him i e sa lvation from the purposelessness of life. 11 (p.18) 
~e ar e led by t his and other statements to recognize the in~ 
.~luence of Gnostic lore and also of the philosophy of Wm.James upon 
Mr. Wells• t hought. It ap~ears that the Englishman searched the his-
tory -of t he early Church with some assiduity and was influenced by 
the Gnostic heresy with regard to the idea of the demi-urge,for his 
conception of God resembles somewhat the demi-urge in its finiteness. 
especially when Wells acknowledges an i ufini te which he calls the 
Veiled Being and describes,as follows: 
11 At the ba.ck of all things there is an impenetrable curtain; 
the ultimate of existence is a Veiled Being,which seems to know 
nothing of life or death· or good or ill. Of that Being,whether it 
is simple or complex or divine,we know nothing; to us it is no more 
t~n the limit of understanding,the unknown beyond. It may be of 
practically limitless intricacy and possibility.• (p.14) 
The indebtedness to Wl4.James and hie ide~ of a finite God 
Mr.Wells freely and even proudly aoknowledgea when he boasts that 
James was his great teacher. It appears that James• solution of the 
problem of evil by means of a finite God appealed most to his pupil 
Wells. 
The defining process of Wells' God,however,involvea alao a 
long 11st of negations,direoted,for the most part,against what ~Jeir 
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author regards as Christian misconceptions and delusions. The denials 
are, briefly st~ted, the·se: God is not II somethin~ magic serving the 
ends of_ men" , viz. , God cannot be conceived as One in whom 11we 11 ve 
and move and have our being11 ; furthermore,God is not J3rovidenoe,nor 
does He punish; He also does not revenge the onslaughts against the 
believers as one might expect from the words "whoso shall offend one 
of these little ones who believe in me,1t were better for p.im that 
a mill-stone be hanged about his neck11 ,etc.; nor dees God "clamour 
for the attention of children" ; and finally, God is not n sexual•, viz.• 
i mposing detailed sexual inhibitions~ la Levitioua,making marriage 
a mystical sacrament and chastity supererogatory (sicl). We see that 
this God of the 11 nev.r religion" is nothing but a bitterly executed 
polemic against orthodox Christianity. 
The positive attributes which Mr.Wells ascribes to his God 
are,to say the least,vague. We shall enumerate them with some little 
comment according to the author's whim: God is Courage,and to this 
assertion t he novelist does not see fit to add. Courage,however,is 
implied in the definition of God as a Person,the second attribute. 
Wells writes: 
11 God is a person who can be known as one knows a friend,who 
can be served and who receives servioe,who partakes of our nature; 
who is,like us, a being in conflict with the unknown and the limit- . 
less and the forces of death; who values much that we val.ue and 1"s 
against much that we are pitted against. He is our king to whom we 
must be poyal; he is our captain,and to lmow him is to have a direc-
tion in our lives. He feels us and knows us; he is hel.ped and glad-
dened by us. He hopes and attempts ••••• God is no abst~aotion nor 
trick of words,no Infinite. He is as real as a bayonet thrust or 
an embraoe. 11 (pp.55f.) 
God is further described as being immaterial and without bo-
dy; "his nature is of the nature· of thought and will". God has no-
thing to do with matter and spaoe,but he exists in time even as 
a current of thought does. God also cbanges,for "aJ.l our truth,all. 
our intentions and achievements,he gathers to himslwf. He is the 
undying human memory,the increasing human will.•. (p.61) 
liodern religionists deny,however,that God is the 1 oolleot1ve 
mind and purpose of the human race". He is not an aggregate,but a 
synthesis,much as a Temple is more than a mere aggregate of stones, 
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or a regiment a mere aggregate of soldiers. The third attribute of 
God is Youth. He II began and is always beginning. He looks forever 
into the future". God is not a patriarch, past his prime, as per the 
ff 
conventional Christian represetation (sicJ); He grows with us. Last 
/1, 
of all,God is Love. And Wells calls God's love an "austere love1 ,for 
it is ae the love of a captain to his soldiers,"who are so foolish, 
so helples s in themselves,so oonf1d1ng,amd yet whose faith aloe 
makes Him possible". 
We note t hat Wells us es theological terrninology after the ac-
cepted fashion with premeditated and telling effect. His God never-
theles s leaves us with a sense of unsatisfied vagueness. We have,it 
seems,been listening to a lagtl of abstractions and metaphysical hypo-
t heses and know nothing of the es sence of the Britisher's God other 
than t hat his maker wishes him to be non-Christian. Let us, therefore, 
viev, thi s God. as a cog i n the cosmogony which Vielle outlines in the 
chapter entttled THE I NVISIBLE KING,this being the keystone chapter 
of the book. We e,re teinpted to say in advance that the author here 
describes a Utopia utterly_ incompatible with human experience. Wells' 
dream has been the dream of every false religion,for he presenta the 
world a s it should be ideally,but as i t never can be practically. He 
hopes ,however,that " modern religion1 will make it such since all o-
thershave failed; and in reviewing hms p~ition he unwittingly falls 
" into the bias of t he millenialists. He dreams anew what,to some ex-
tent,Plato,Confucius,Brahma,Origin,Tauler sad Spener dreamed before 
him in vain. The outline of his cosmogony,however,helpa us to view 
his God a bit more realistically. 
As we observed above,God 1s finite in this world. He "faces 
the blackness of the unknown and the blind joys and confusions and 
cruelties of life,as one who leads mankind through a dark jungle to 
a great conquest". uan,that ia,of course,the believer,is God's ser-
vant who completely renounces himself in the service of God. The 
- - -c:- ... .::.oa+ "'"nnnoa+. .. Q +.hA.t o f Death .death in every fo;rm.viz,." death of 
the raoe, ••.. the petty death of ind.olence,insuffienoy,ba;eneea,mie-
0Onception,and perversion". God fights (Wells stresses the incongru-
ity between God llilitant and the non-resisting Crucified Christ),and 
he fights to effect a kingdom which is to be 11 a peaceful and coordi-
nated activity of all mankind upon certain divine ends". These di-
vine ends a re the following: 
11 These,t e conceive,are first,tbe maintenance of the racial life; 
secondly,the exploration of the external being of nature as it is 
and as it ha s been,that is to say history and science; thirdly,that 
exploration of inh erent human possibility which is art; fourthly, 
that clarification of thought and knowledge which is philosophy; "8,nd 
finally,th e pr ogressive enlargement and developement of the racial 
life u.1 der t hese lif lts, so that God may work through a continually 
better body of humanity and through- better and better equipped minds, 
that he and our race may increase for ever, worlcing unendingly upon 
the developement of t he powers of life and the mastery of the blind 
forces of matter t hroughout the deeps of space. He sets out with 
us, we are p ersua.ded, to conquer our~elves and our world and the stars. n 
{p-p .107f.) 
The part t h ich the believer plays as the servant of God is 
summed ·up i n t he ords: 11 Service,a11d service alone,is the criterion 
that t he quickened conscience shall recognize". And,since God is 
open to al l rnen,the quickened conscience of man must reach to the 
noble vork ,hi ch the militant GQd wishes to ef fect in hie t heooracy. 
And,as wa.s noted previously,the "finding of Him is salvation from 
the pur.9oselessnes s of life11 • 
In t h is connection,as a conclusion,we wish to present Wells• 
justification for tne revudiation of creeds. It is consistent with 
his entire t eogony,BU1acking as it does of harsh utilitarianism. He 
states,namely.tbat "the service of God is not to achieve e delicate 
consistency of statemnt (sicl); it is to do as much as one can of 
God's '7ork11 • (p.126). 
As wa~ indicated earlier,Wells can hardly be reckoned as a 
yhilosopher,and in his conception of God one might almost accuse 
him of being a religious charlatan. GOD,THE INVISIBLE KING is a 
hodge-podge of sectarian new revelation and religious experience 
combined with the finite God of Wm.James and a work righteousness 
28. 
which is balm to the hearts of the sa.J'itts. \':ells' God was invented 
II, 
as a convenience for the man-about-town of the 20th Oentury,and 
its depth and sincerity are commensurate with its origin. In shel-
ving the "philosopher V/ells11 , we are reminded oJ the caustic com-
ment of Edwar d Shanks, who,in contrasting the relative merits of 
Gal~worthy and ~·ells as contemporary Enlish men-of-letters,said: 
nMr.Oalsworthy i s a creat ive artist who,however hard he has tried 
to be somet hing elee,has failed; Mr.Wells was a creative artist 
who t ri ed t o become sor.1ething else and did so. 11 
In bri gi ne; t o a close our discussion of the conception of 
God in moder n philoso!)hy, we must confess tha.t we feel that we 
have not a t tai ned the goal of our thesis; for the conception of 
God in moder n philosophy. does not exist,as such. The variety of 
t he conceptions of God among philosophers is so diversified as to 
admit of no s ynt he sis except a few generalities. The treatment of 
the syecific phi lospphers in our paper verifies this statement, 
for t he width of t he world lies between the sharply dialectic con-
cept ion of . oyce,the pluralistic conceptions of Bergson and James, 
a.nd t he :pur ely fictive deity of Wells. 
We mi ght,however, divide the philosophies which we have con-
conventional 
sidered under t wo/heads,narnely,the a priori~ype of which Royce is 
an able exyonent, a nd the a posteriori type which includes Bergson, 
James and !ells. A number of general objections have be~n levelled 
against both,which,in conclusion,we should like to diaousa. 
The a nriori school ;s,as we know,essentially deductive and 
reasons a cosmogony which is ideal,as Royce has done. But the sbar-
pest thorn in the side of such a system is the problem of evil. In 
our discussion of the philosophy of James we treated at some length 
James••repudiation of Absolute Idealism because of its failure to 
solve the problem of evil satisfactorily; for who,eays James,oan 
29. 
be satisfied with the explanation that the evil in this world is 
not really evil but merely an appearance of evil which is justified 
as a part of the perf ect whole~ James has quite correctly stated 
the general obj~ct.ion which still offers dif:ficulty to t he exponents 
of the a nriori school. It has also been held that God and the Ab-
aolute cannot be har monized,because,while the Absolute alone is Re-
ality ~nd f i nite beings II appea.rances11 ,man in his fini tude carries 
over these liuiitations to his conception of God,who is,as a result, 
merely 11 a finite and human conception formed on the level of appea-
rances, a.nd is not absolutely truen. For practical purposes,however, 
it ha s been a.gr eed t hat such a conception of God may be logically 
consi st ent with the Absolute;and,hence,the conception of the Ab-
solute i s frequently held to be possible of harmonization with the 
Christian conception. 
a t h r ega,r d to the a tJosteriori thinkers, a number of very 
serious objections have been r a.ised,particularly becau.ae: GJf the 
gr eat diver g ence of t his school of t hought from the traditional. 
concept i on of a God who is infinite and unchanging. Dr.L.Frank1in 
Gruber of Aayv1ood (Ill.) treat s the subject quite extensively in 
t wo tracts published in the BIBLIOTHEOA SACHA (Oct.,1918) and THE 
LUTHERA:· QUARTERLY (Jan. ,1921) and has very satisfactorily listed 
the general objections. He regards Bergson's philosoph~ as being 
the starting point for the tpeory of a finite God and emphasizes 
the fact that,although Bergson has not definitely identitied his 
Vital Impulse with God,his disciples have done so,as for example, 
James and after him Wells. Assuming that the universe is developing 
through the process of creative evolution,Dr.Gruber asks,what bas 
that to do with God? Experiential philosophy cannot ipso facto 
fathom transcendental problems,and the great fallacy of the Berg-
sonian view lies in the fact that it includes God in the universe 
\ 
and then tries tcj<iefine Him a la creative evolution. No,says Gruber, 
-. 
for, even a ssuming creative evolution t .o be a ~ct together with its 
concomitant, the Vital Impulse, what prevents one from regarding them 
as mere modi onerandi of God? Evolution is finite because it works 
with a Xature created finite. Is it not a fact that God is included 
in the universe,in Nature,a priori and not &Jpost•r~eri according 
to this sytem,and then proved finite? And it does not at all f ollow 
that, because t he · Cr eation is finite,the Creator is likwise finite. 
The very contary i s true,for a petitio orincipii exists in the 
!denial of an i nf inite since this conoeut is already suggested in the concept 11 f inite11 • Furt hermore,according to Gruber,this school 
of philosophy stresses too much t be evil in the world. They hold 
t ha~. God must be finLte because of all the evil roundabout since 
an ~mnipot ent,onis cient God could not include evil in his essence, 
but t hey ner,; l ect t o consider the fa.ct that limited,finite man reads 
limitations a.l so i nt o Mature. (Mote t he similarity between the 
reasoning gf Dr. Gruber and Prof.Royce). And ma.n,as an agent created 
morally f ree,is a lone responsible for sin. Finally,acoording to 
Gruber, i mper fectiotj. in l~~ture 1nay be expla.ineafas merely evil appea-
rances of t he perfect whole a ccording to the logic of the Absolute 
Idealis te, and Dr.Gruber ~ives fresh significance to this statement, 
and incident a lly a distinct snub to Bergsonians,by maintaining that 
this view i s all the more tenable ~hen considered in the ebb am 
flow of creative evolution. The idea of an infinite and unchangeing 
God is tenable from reason as well as Scripture in the opinion of 
this learned and scientific Lutheran apologist,ahd the great doc-
trines of redemption,incarnation and atonement are consistent with 
it. 
Thus we see that the systems which we have treated are open 
to a number of serious objections from the view-point of reason. 
We shall also see,however,tha.t a greater objection holds. Although 
differing widely in a number of pointa,all four systems agree per-
~~-.---------------------~ 
fectly in one point, and that is the fact that they speculate a God. 
And herein lies their irreconcilability with Christianity. 
The Christia n God is the God of revelation. He cannot be in-
duced froni the facts of nature and life; the facts of nature and 
life must,instead, be interpreted according to the God Who revealed 
the fact t hat He has created and still preserves them. It seems, 
therefore,to t he 'l.7riter that,no matter whether a man be an ortho-
dox Christian or a purely materialistic pagan,he cannot fail to see 
that t he ,od of Chriet iane and the God of philosophy must,by their 
very origin, be i ncompatible. The attempt of Prof.lliller to inter-
pret Bergson•s conception, and the similar attempt of Prof.Floumoy 
to i nt er pret J a.mes, a s being compatible with Christian theism must, 
as a consequ ence,be termed failures. 
\"'e do not doubt t hat a harmonization between the two concep-
tions i s possi ble in a general way. And i n this connection we might 
urge t he apologetic va lue of the study of philosophy. Natural man 
has a vague knowl edge of God,according to Scripturea,and philosophy 
substantiates this. It does not,however,follow that ergo,the God 
Whom t hey have speculated ie. the Christian God. In the first place, 
as was stated above,their ~od is the God of speculation; their re-
ligion is that of experience,the inner light,character and aalw.tion 
through self. And in the second place,their aystema make no roan 
for Christ the saviour. To them He is little more than the sage Oon-
fuc~ius. The doctrine of the vicarious satisfaction and justifica-
tion they repudiate in favor of a religion of works which satisfies 
the guilty conscience of natural man. How then oan a person who · 
understands the Lutheran oonfessiona,whether he be believer orun-
believer,maintain t hat these two opposite oonoeptiona,the.t of the 
Christian and tbat of the philoaopher,are compatible? There may 
be traces of similarity; but compatibility ia utterly out of the 
question. 
E. Vl .Lyman in THEOLOGY AND HU!!AN PROBLEMS (p.21),in speakizg 
of the God of one of these systems,that of the Absolute Idealists, 
states the -problem very clearly: 
"As one contert1plates t he idea of t he timeless Absolute in its 
strict meaning---and especially as one regards it from the stand-
point of the ethica~life with its constant activity in the produc-
tion of spiritual goods---it loses all power to call forth ourwor-
ship, and. appears like a huge,spherical aquarium encomP,;uassing within 
itself motion and life,but as a whole rigid,glassy an otionlesa. 
surely the ti~eles s Absolute is not the supreme so+ve of human 
problems,nor the God to whose worship we should summon the aspiring 
and struggling sons of men. 11 
And whet her God is considered as tiraeless or as finite is not 
of decisive i mportance in rendering the verdict against philosophy, 
for to t he writer the Gods of all philosophic systems fit the descrip-
ted quoted above. Disciples of Bergson and ·James,and Royce and Wells 
themselves have a t t empted to identify their conceptions of God with 
t he Christian conception,but we believe this to be logically impos-
sible, as i de f r om a ll minor di f ficulties in the desired harmonization 
process, a lone f r om t he f act that a God who is the product of specu-
lation cannot i pso f acto be compatible with the God of revelation. 
And as a fi nal thought stres sing the gulf between religionpnd philo-
sophy, we shoul d like to cite the words which a friend 1\9s written as 
a conclusion to t lle reading of Will Durant I s THE STORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 
On the fly-leaf of his volume we find the following_ very adequate 
words: 
"As I read tonight in old St.Louia,listening to the dripping 
of the r a in from the eaves,I seek a picture that will give my impres-
sion of the voices of these iovers of wisdom. The picture is ready 
to hand,for through the open window come the harsh cries of a great 
flock of wild ducks fl-ying south away from the Canadian chill. They 
make t heir way t hr ough the dreary,darnp sky with no star or moon for 
comfort and guidance. They fly in a great V,all aiming for the genial 
Southern waters,as philosophers seek for truth. But the tragedy is 
here that the unerring instinct which guides the birds aright,and 
which mi ght guide the philosophers if they would fly by faith and 
not by reason,has been lost to the philosophic world when it discar-
ded the oracles of God. The wise of this world,decoyed by their own 
exceeding wisdom,are an easy bag for Satan•s hunting." 
33. 
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